age of 60 (Mulcahy, Hickey and Maurer, 1967) . This point has important relevance when we are discussing the relationship between coronary heart disease and such factors as stress, trauma and occupation.
Before discussing these latter factors reference must be made to the influences which cause a patient with asymptomatic atherosclerosis to develop the first clinical signs of coronary heart disease. In general it can be said that the development of the clinical manifestations is delayed until the arterial condition is considerably advanced and until it involves vessels elsewhere as well as those of the heart. The ultimate acute heart attack is frequently precipitated by the development of a clot at the site of partial obstruction or by the development of other disturbances, such as small haemorrhages in the wall of the diseased vessel itself, which may critically occlude the bore of the narrowed vessel. The development of clinical evidence of the disease is merely an expression of the gradual progression of the condition and in clinical practice it is seldom that one can pinpoint an event or a factor which was clearly responsible for the precipitation of the first symptoms.
There is no evidence from the extensive literature available to suggest that atherosclerosis is causally related to occupation or to any form of acute or prolonged physical or mental strain. The words "strain" or "stress" are frequently used in relation to the causation of atherosclerosis but are seldom clearly defined. Also, they are virtually impossible to measure by any reliable techniques. Workers all over the world have accepted the risk factors previously mentioned as being highly associated with the development of atherosclerosis and coronary disease but, with few exceptions, no researcher will consider physical or mental strain or stress, however they are defined, as important.
Equally it can be said that the clinical manifestations of atherosclerosis, such as coronary heart disease, have not been associated with any particular occupation and, with few exceptions, no association has been established between the first clinical symptoms of the disease and physical or mental strain. Also, there are relatively few well documented cases of cardiac infarction where the attack could be attributed to direct or indirect injury to the chest and other events arising out of an accident or a patient's employment. Contrary views are frequently expressed in court and elsewhere but I contend that these views are not based on adequate evidence. Rarely a coronary attack will be induced in a person who suffers an injury associated with shock and a drop in blood pressure. In such cases the fall in blood pressure may unmask the circulatory impairment which is already present in the patient with diseased arteries. Even in such a case the subject is already suffering from an advanced degree of atherosclerosis. In the presence of low blood pressure a coronary attack will not happen if the coronary arteries are healthy.
To support the view that direct trauma to the chest is seldom related causally to a coronary attack, there is a report of 546 cases, quoted by Lasky (1966) of severe chest injuries going to post-mortem examination. Death in all cases was due to such catastrophes as rupture of the heart or of the main vessels, puncturing of the lung and haemorrhage around the heart and the main structures of the chest, but in no case was death attributed to cardiac infarction. Lasky's paper was published to report one case of cardiac infarction following direct chest injury, whilst the publication of other single case reports in leading medical journals (Harthorne et aI, 1967) testify to the relative rarity of such cases.
I myself have seen a few cases of severe chest injury. In no case was a heart attack a sequel of the injury.
A typical case was a man of 32 years who suffered a severe steering wheel accident. He fractured his sternum, numerous ribs and two vertebrae. He may have suffered a contusion of his heart muscle and did suffer from haemorrhage into the pericardial sac. He eventually made a complete recovery but at no time was a coronary attack suspected from the clinical or electrocardiographic data, nor would such a complication be expected in the absence of an advanced degree of atherosclerosis. Even in such circumstances an immediate coronary attack would be unusual.
In discussing the legal aspects of coronary heart disease I should like to refer to some different legal situations. First, we are aware that accidents may be caused as a consequence of a coronary attack. It has already been stated that unexpected and instantaneous death is almost invariably caused by this disease, and it is clear that in such an event some untoward happening might result from a person's sudden demise. However, the general experience is that, even in those who die suddenly from coronary heart disease, there is sufficient warning of impending doom for a subject to stop a car or to desist from other activities which might constitute a danger to themselves and others. For this reason we invariably allow patients with a history of coronary heart disease to return to a normal life and to car driving, but generally we discourage the resumption of activities where the subject may be responsible for the safety of a large number of other people. Bus drivers, airline pilots, train drivers and persons in certain other responsible and hazardous occupations should not be permitted to resume normal employment.
I recently saw a van driver who developed a relatively rare heart condition called heart block. This lesion is often associated with coronary heart disease and may be complicated by rather sudden but transient attacks of unconsciousness. He had his first attack whilst driving and he crashed his van into a ditch. Although the heart block was identified after the accident, there is no evidence in the research literature to link heart block with direct or indirect chest injuries. Indeed it is nearly always a condition of spontaneous onset. Although the plaintiff made no attempt to explain the accident, he claimed that the heart block was caused by the accident. I am unaware of the result of his claim but from the medical point of view I am satisfied that his heart block was the cause and not the result of the accident.
I should now like to refer to cases of coronary heart disease which are alleged to be caused or aggravated by motor accidents, accidents at work and elsewhere.
Perhaps I should say that it is important that an autopsy should always be performed on a subject who has died after an accident. As previously stated, there is seldom unequivocal evidence to associate trauma with coronary attacks and deaths from this condition, but there are many other accident induced injuries which may bring immediate or delayed death and which may be diagnosed clinically as coronary disease. I refer to such conditions as rupture of the heart muscle, puncturing of the lungs with pneumothorax, damage to the main vessels and in particular the condition of pulmonary embolism which is not an infrequent sequel of a severe accident and which has its source in clotting in the veins of the legs and the pelvis followed by dislodgement of the clot and its passage to the main vessels of the lungs. Pulmonary embolism may be easily confused with coronary heart disease but its presence should be clearly defined because it can invariably be linked causally with the preceding accident.
I was asked to advise about a 51-year-old man who died a few weeks after a chest injury. He refused to stay in hospital and after his death his wife refused to allow an autopsy. I was reasonably satisfied from an examination of his case-history that his death was not caused by coronary heart disease but that he had serious damage to some intrathoracic structure such as the lungs or blood vessels. In such a case an autopsy would have avoided much of the trouble and the speculation which followed later.
It is my experience that plaintiffs not infrequently claim a relationship between an accident and a coronary attack. It is also my experience that I have seen only once case where such an association could be reasonably presumed. I have on two or three occasions in all stated that a heart attack associated with a preceding accident may possibly have been precipitated by direct injury to the chest, or its consequences, such as shock and low blood presure. I believe the following criteria should be fulfilled before a relationship can be reasonably presumed.
1. There should be direct and adequate injury to the chest.
2. The effect of the injury should be immediate.
3. Damage to the heart muscles must be proven.
In a case where these three criteria are fulfilled, one might then say that the patient's heart attack was causally related to the accident but that the heart attack merely represented an aggravation of an underlying chronic disease process. Indeed I would also be influenced by the subject's risk factor status. If he were clearly without any of the well-established coronary risk factors it could be assumed that he was relatively free from atherosclerosis. A coronary attack following an accident in such a person must be an extremely rare event.
Reference should also be made to coronary heart disease in relation to Workmen's Compensation and to situations where coronary heart disease is alleged to be caused or aggravated by a person's occupation or where it is considered to be an occupational hazard.
Workmens' Compensation was originally intended to protect the employee against accidents arising out of or in the course of employment. In some cases compensation may be paid to employees who allege that they have been subjected to unusual exertion or unusual responsibility in excess of their capabilities. In such cases the onus may be on the employer to prove that the trouble was not caused by the accident or by the occupational excesses, and proving a nonrelationship may require very substantial evidence indeed.
We have in some jurisdictions the situation where coronary heart disease is considered an accepted hazard of certain occupations. In Massachusetts, under the Heart Laws, employees in certain occupations considered to be stressful, such as the police, the prison service, the fire service and the river boat service, are considered to be prone to this disease because of their occupation and are therefore automatically compensated if they have any heart illness. Interestingly enough, in Massachusetts the legislators have included themselves in this privileged position, presumably because they consider the profession of politics to be unusually hazardous.
In the situation in Massachusetts and elsewhere the role of the physician is completely ignored. Perhaps this is symptomatic of the public attitude that Workmens' Compensation should be an integral part of income insurance and that the workman's security and well-being should not be related to the culpability or otherwise of himself or others in relation to his misfortunes. It can be said, therefore, that in certain jurisdictions coronary heart disease may be automatically compensable in particular occupational groups and this applies to other disabilities as well.
I would like to discuss briefly the significance and the effects of the gradual liberalization of the laws in relation to Workmens' Compensation.
The decreasing role the physician has to play can certainly be attributed to the lack of agreement in the past amongst medical expert witnesses on the natural history and causes of coronary heart disease, on its management, prognosis and, indeed, on its very diagnosis. Social and economic pressures and a desire to satisfy these are overshadowing the need to base conclusions on medical evidence, and public opinion and not medical opinion is the deciding influence in the development of our attitudes to Workmens' Compensation.
However, I would like to say a few words about professional attitudes in relation to the legal aspects of coronary heart disease. First of all, the attitude of the well-informed expert witness will be based on a full insight into the pathology, causation and natural history of coronary heart disease. He cannot accept that atherosclerosis is caused by an accident or by a particular occupation and he will only rarely accept that the clinical manifestations of coronary heart disease can be attributed to an aggravation of the subject's condition by an injury. He will occasionally be in doubt about the relationship between an accident and the aggravation of a coronary illness. In such a case his doubt will probably and rightly be viewed in favour of the plaintiff. With well-informed expert witnesses, such situations will rarely occur.
I should like to say something about the attitude of the less well-informed medical witness. Much of the uncertainty and contradictory evidence which is provided in the law courts in relation to medical problems in general and coronary heart disease in particular is the result of inadequate knowledge of the subject amongst the medical witnesses concerned. This lack of knowledge is largely responsible for the present situation where the doctor's role is of doubtful authority and where the scientific basis of contradictory evidence is irrelevant to the final judgement. Indeed, it must be frustrating for a judge and jury to hear contradictory evidence in a specialist field and they can hardly be blamed if the final decision is based on humanitarian, social and economic rather than medical issues. Perhaps these issues could be summed up as "common sense" ones.
Apart from the doctors' poor acquaintance with the scientific facts, there are other difficulties in the situation for the medical witness. The doctor is frequently associated with the patient in a personal and professional capacity, and his humanistic outlook cannot but be affected by" the medical burden and the economic disabilities of his patient. His judgement of the facts and his opinion can be unconsciously affected by his sympathy and goodwill for the patient. Also, he may be strongly motivated in holding a point of view entirely for reasons of professional pride. Under these circumstances it is very difficult for the doctor to separate his scientific from his personal and humanistic emotions, and, particularly when his opinion is based on a slender acquaintance with the scientific background of coronary heart disease, one can understand the frequency of contradictory evidence in these cases. I believe the following case-history provides convincing proof that medical evidence of a non-scientific nature is just as acceptable as scientifically based evidence, and in this regard I believe that doctors will say things in court which they would not dare to say at professional meetings with their own colleagues:
A man of 49 years was involved in a car crash but suffered no physical injury. He remained normally active and apparently well for five weeks and then suffered a rather severe coronary thrombosis. He was admitted to hospital where he remained for six weeks and where he was treated in the usual manner. He was seen by me at the request of the defendant company eleven months after the accident when I found him to have made a good recovery from the heart attack, but he had not yet returned to work. He complained of a variety of symptoms which I was satisfied were not of an organic nature. It was claimed that his heart attack was the result of the accident. Because he had suffered no injury at the time and his attack was delayed by five weeks, I was entirely satisfied in my own mind that there was no relationship between the two events. I was equally satisfied from the history I took and from my physical examination that he was a high risk case for coronary heart disease and that he probably suffered from widespread atherosclerosis.
This case was ultimately heard in the High Court two years after his coronary attack. The general practitioner and the two physicians called by thae plaintiff were unanimous in their views that the heart condition was directly caused by the accident. They were also unanimous in their opinion that he had been incapable of working for the preceding two years and that he would be unable to work in the future because of his disability. Finally it was stated by the most experienced physician amongst the three that his heart condition was such that the organ might burst at any moment.
With all these views I profoundly disagreed. I considered that his inability to work over the period of two years was the result of pressures relating to impending litigation. I considered him quite fit to work and this opinion is confirmed by my recent experience with 500 male patients under 65 years with coronary heart disease whom I have seen. It is my experience from this large series of subjects that the patient with the coronary attack who is normally motivated to return to work can be safely and beneficially returned to his normal activities within six weeks of the commencement of his illness, except in very unusual cases where complications exist. Such complications did not exist in the plaintiff's case.
I also considered that he was fit to return to work at the time of the court proceedings and I could produce the most authoritative evidence that there was no possibility of a ruptured heart in the case of a person whose cardiac infarct had undergone normal healing. In short I could marshall all the scientific evidence to contradict the opinions of my three colleagues, but, before I could do so, counsel for the defendant strongly advised a settlement of the case. The point was made to me that such convincing and unanimous evidence presented by three of my colleagues could not be effectively contradicted even by the most compelling scientific arguments.
The plaintiff's own practitioner showed a compassion towards her patient which was impressive, whilst one of the physicians was senior to myself and a person of unusual eminence and academic standing. In the circumstances I believe the decision to settle was a wise one.
In reviewing the attitude of the lawyer to coronary heart disease in the courts, one must accept that he will review cause and effect in a less subtle manner and with less sophisticated knowledge of scientific factors. Anyhow he is committed on behalf of his client.
The general public, including jury members, will, of course, be influenced by the logic of scientific argument and professional evidence, but their receptivity in this regard will clash with other emotions. The effect of physical disability and of economic hardship may motivate them to relieve the plaintiff's burden as much as possible. Also, it is clear that there are increasing social pressures to provide for everybody in misfortune irrespective of his own lack of responsibility or his culpability in the event of an accident or an occupational injury. One of the effects of the increasing "welfare state" attitude of the public must be to liberalize our Workmens' Compensation laws. As I said before, the general public must be often confused by the contradictions in medical evidence, so that in reaching decisions they tend to take the commonsense view. I can summarize therefore by saying that the evidence accepted in a court of law in cases involving heart complaints is often based on unscientific grounds. Such unscientific evidence will often influence final decisions and judgements. I believe that the medical profession is largely responsible for this state of affairs but that an increasingly important influence in providing automatic compensability is derived from public attitudes and social pressures.
Perhaps we can say that the present liberalization of our attitudes towards Workmens' Compensation and the decreasing role of the medical expert are desirable trends. However, I believe that the disadvantages of these trends should at least be adverted to although I might add that recent legislation in Ireland (Social Welfare Occupational Injuries Act, 1966) has tended to eliminate some of these disadvantages.
An important effect is the increasing reluctance of industry and the business world to employ heart cases. We know that very many patients who have had heart troubles are suitable for full employment and that their employment is essential to their own physical and psychological rehabilitation and is also of benefit to society in general. Attempts by our profession and by organizations in the rehabilitation field to have heart cases re-employed are frustrated at many turns. This is no longer a problem in Ireland today but it certainly exists as :1 problem on other jurisdictions where there are more traditional Workmens' Compensation Laws.
The need for employers to safeguard themselves accounts for their reluctance to employ established heart cases in other jurisdictions. It also accounts for the increasing use of the medical examination to eliminate people with established heart disease and to eliminate high risk patients before they are accepted on the payroll. Hypertension, gross overweight, perhaps even abnormal cholesterol, may militate against a person's opportunity of seeking employment and in the future I can envisage a situation where other risk factors such as cigarette smoking will be considered undesirable.
In motor accident cases, decisions based on the commonsense and humanistic view, where the scientific basis of evidence has been rejected or not considered, are essentially unfair to the defendant and in the full analysis lead to higher premium and to greater expense for the whole community. One might say that the large insurance companies can bear it but one wonders if public morality is such that the laudable wish to help others in misfortune justifies a less rigid degree of fairness and justice.
But the greatest injustice done in the present situation is to the patient or plaintiff himself. I have already stated that the great majority of patients who survive a coronary attack will succeed in returning to normal life and to their normal occupation within six to eight weeks of a heart attack. When the question of litigation arises, however, the contrast in the management of the patient is dramatic to say the least, so that his prospects of normal recovery and rehabilitation are greatly prejudiced. The prolonged process of litigation leads to an exaggeration of the plaintiff's disability and to an unwarranted delay in the process of rehabilitation. The complex proceedings involved must impair the patient's will to return to a normal life and are more harmful to the patient from the psychological point of view than the effect of the original trauma. Also, the proceedings may stimulate the plaintiff's cupidity, an emotion which I believe may lie dormant in many of us. My own experience of litigation has always profoundly impressed me with the serious effect upon the plaintiff himself.
Also, I wonder if the unwillingness to judge issues in the cold light of logic and scientific fact does not represent a certain breakdown in public integrity. I believe there is a need to rationalise the present situation and to take greater cognisance of scientific principles in the law courts when the question of the relationship of illness or injury to accident or occupation is being considered. In this regard I believe that our courts are backward and naive in their acceptance of any qualified doctor as an expert witness in any specialist medical field. The same standard of scientific evidence and of documented sources should be demanded in the courts that one expects nowadays in our own professional medical societies.
